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TaintScope: A Checksum-Aware Directed Fuzzing Tool for Automatic Software Vulnerability Detection

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Outline

Introduction

- Background
- Motivation

TaintScope

- Intuition
- System Design
- Evaluation


Microsoft[®] Google

Conclusion

Adobe


Fuzzing/Fuzz Testing

- Feed target applications with malformed inputs e.g., invalid, unexpected, or random test cases
 - Proven to be remarkably successful
 - E.g., randomly mutate well-formed inputs and runs the target application with the "*mutations*"



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
Fuzzing is great



In the best case, malformed inputs will explore different program paths, and trigger security vulnerabilities



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


 Malformed images will be dropped when the decoder function detects checksums mismatch

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Checksum: the bottleneck

Checksum is a common way to test the integrity of input data




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Our motivation Penetrate checksum checks! **Our Goal**

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Intuition

Disable checksum checks by control flow alteration



Mødgfnad program

- Fuzz the modified program
- Repair the checksum fields in malformed inputs that can crash the modified program


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Key Questions

- Q1: How to locate the checksum test instructions in a binary program?
- Q2: How to effectively and efficiently fuzz for security vulnerability detection?
- Q3: How to generate the correct checksum value for the invalid inputs that can crash the modified program?


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TaintScope Overview



Key Observation 1

Checksum is usually used to protect a <u>large number</u> of input bytes




- Based on fine-grained taint analysis, we first find the <u>conditional jump instructions (e.g., jz, je)</u> that depend on more than a certain number of input bytes
- Take these conditional jump instructions as candidates

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Key Observation 2

Well-formed inputs can pass the checksum test, but most malformed inputs cannot

 We log the behaviors of candidate conditional jump instructions




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Key Observation 2

Well-formed inputs can pass the checksum test, but most malformed inputs cannot

- We log the behaviors of candidate conditional jump instructions
- Run well-formed inputs, identify the always-taken and always-not-taken insts




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Key Observation 2

Well-formed inputs can pass the checksum test, but most malformed inputs cannot

- We log the behaviors of candidate conditional jump instructions
- Run well-formed inputs, identify the (1)always-taken and always-not-taken insts
- Run malformed inputs, also identify the (2) always-taken and always-not-taken insts




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Key Observation 2

Well-formed inputs can pass the checksum test, but most malformed inputs cannot


- We log the behaviors of candidate conditional jump instructions
- Run well-formed inputs, identify the always-taken and always-not-taken insts
- ② Run malformed inputs, also identify the always-taken and always-not-taken insts
- Identify the conditional jump inst that behaves completely different when processing well-formed and malformed inputs



Conclusion

A2: Effective and efficient fuzzing

 Blindly mutating will create huge amount of redundant test cases --- ineffective and inefficient



- Directed fuzzing: focus on modifying the "hot bytes" that refer to the input bytes flow into critical system/library calls
 - Memory allocation, string operation...

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A3: Generate the correct checksum

 The classical solution is symbolic execution and constraint solving
Solving checksum(Data) == Chksum is hard or impossible, if both Data and Chksum are symbolic values

We use combined concrete/symbolic execution

- Only leave the bytes in the checksum field as symbolic values
- Collect and solve the trace constraints on *Chksum* when reaching the checksum test inst.
- Note that:
 - **checksum**(**D**_{ata}) is a runtime determinable constant value.
 - Chksum originates from the checksum field, but may be transformed, such as from hex/oct to dec number, from little-endian to big-endian.

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Design Summary

Directed Fuzzing

- Identify and modify "hot bytes" in valid inputs to generate malformed inputs
 - On top of *PIN* binary instrumentation platform

Checksum-aware Fuzzing

- □ Locate checksum check points and checksum fields.
- Modify the program to accept all kinds input data
- Generate correct checksum fields for malformed inputs that can crash the modified program
 - Offline symbolically execute the trace, using STP solver

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Evaluation

Component evaluation

- E1: Whether TaintScope can locate checksum points and checksum fields?
- E2: How many hot byte in a valid input?
- E3: Whether TaintScope can generate a correct checksum field?

Overall evaluation

E4: Whether TaintScope can detect previous unknown vulnerabilities in real-world applications?

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Evaluation 1: locate checksum points

 We test several common checksum algorithms, including CRC32, MD5, Adler32. TaintScope accurately located the check statements.

Executable	Package (Version)	File Format	Checksum Algorithm	$ \mathcal{A} $	$ (\mathcal{P}_1 \cap \mathcal{P}'_0) \cup (\mathcal{P}_0 \cap \mathcal{P}'_1) $	Detected?
PicasaPhotoViewer	Google Picasa (3.1)	PNG	CRC32	830	1	\checkmark
Acrobat	Adobe Acrobat (9.1.3)	FNU	CRC52	5,805	1	\checkmark
Snort	snort (2.8.4.1)	PCAP	TCP/IP checksum	2	2	\checkmark
tcpdump	tcpdump (4.0.0)	rear	ICF/IF CIECKSUII	5	2	\checkmark
sigtool	clamav (0.95.2)	CVD	MD5	2	1	\checkmark
vcdiff	open-vcdiff (0.6)	VCDIFF	Adler32	1	1	\checkmark
Tar	GNU Tar (1.22)	Tar Archive	Tar checksum	9	1	
objcopy	GNU binutils (2.17)	Intel HEX	Intel HEX checksum	62	1	\checkmark

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Evaluation 2: identify hot bytes

• We measured the number of bytes could affect the size arguments in memory allocation functions

Executable	Package	Input Format	Input Size (Bytes)	# Hot Bytes	# X86 Instrs	Run Time
	ImageMagick	TIEE	5778	18	191,759,211	2m53s
		TIFF	2,020	18	82,640,260	1m30s
Display		PNG	5,149	9	19,051,746	1m54s
Display	magemagick	rivo	1,250	29	47,246,043	1m8s
		$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	6,617	11	48,983,897	1m13s
		JILO	6,934	9	48,823,905	1m11s
	Google Picasa	GIE	3,190	14	304,993,501	1m25s
		OIL	6,529	43	536,938,567	2m57s
Dicasa Dhoto Viewer eve		oogle Picasa PNG	2,730	18	712,021,776	5m16s
PicasaPhotoViewer.exe			1,362	16	660,183,239	4m8s
		DMD	3,174	8	310,909,256	1m21s
		DIVIE	7,462	19	468,273,580	2m35s
		DMD	1,440	6	658,370,048	4m25s
		DIVIE	3,678	6	663,923,080	5m2s
Aprohatava	Adobe Acrobat	DNC	770	21	297,492,758	3m8s
Actobal.exe	Auode Actobat	FINO	1,250	12	354,685,431	4m31s
		IDEC	1,012	13	328,365,912	4m14s
		JLEO	2,356	4	356,136,453	4m36s

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Evaluation 3: generate correct checksum fields

- We test malformed inputs in four kinds of file formats.
- TaintScope is able to generate correct checksum fields.

Executable	File Format	# fields	field	Repaired?	Time (s)
display	PNG	4	4	\checkmark	271.9
tcpdump	PCAP	8	2	\checkmark	455.6
tar	Tar Archive	3	8	\checkmark	572.8
objcopy	Intel HEX	4	2	\checkmark	327.1

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Evaluation 4 : 27 previous unknown vulns



Evaluation 4 : 27 previous unknown vulns



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- Drew Yao of Apple Product Security (<u>http://www.apple.com/support/security/</u>) (CVE-2009-2980)
- Stefano Di Paola of Minded Security (<u>http://www.mindedsecurity.com/</u>) (CVE-2009-2981)
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- Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team (http://www.google.com/corporate/security.html) (CVE-2009-2984)
- An anonymous researcher reported through TippingPoint's Zero Day Initiative (<u>http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/</u>) (CVE-2009-2985)
- Will Dormann, CERT (<u>http://www.cert.org/</u>) (CVE-2009-2986)
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Evaluation 4: 27 previous unknown vulns

Package	Vuln-Type	# Vulns	Checksum-aware?	Advisory	Severity Rating
Microsoft Paint	Memory Corruption	1	N	CVE-2010-0028	Moderate
Google Picasa	Infinite loop	1	N	pending	N/A
Google Ficasa	Integer Overflow	1	IN	SA38435	Moderate
Adobe Acrobat	Infinite loop	1	N	CVE-2009-2995	Extremely critical
Auobe Actobat	Memory Corruption	1	N	CVE-2009-2989	Extremely critical
ImageMagick	Integer Overflow	1	N	CVE-2009-1882	Moderate
CamlImage	Integer Overflow	3	Y	CVE-2009-2660	Moderate
LibTIFF	Integer Overflow	2	N	CVE-2009-2347	Moderate
wxWidgets	Buffer Overflow	2	N	CVE-2009-2369	Moderate
wa wingets	Double Free	1	Y	CVE-2009-2309	Moderate
IrfanView	Integer Overflow	1	N	CVE-2009-2118	High
GStreamer	Integer Overflow	1	Y	CVE-2009-1932	Moderate
Dillo	Integer Overflow	1	Y	CVE-2009-2294	High
XEmacs	Integer Overflow	3	Y	CVE-2009-2688	Moderate
ALIIIdes	Null Dereference	1	N	N/A	N/A
MPlayer	Null Dereference	2	N	N/A	N/A
PDFlib-lite	Integer Overflow	1	Y	SA35180	Moderate
Amaya	Integer Overflow	2	Y	SA34531	High
Winamp	Buffer Overflow	1	N	SA35126	High
Total		27			250

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Conclusion

- Checksum is a big challenge for fuzzing tools
- TaintScope can perform:
 - Directed fuzzing
 - Identify which bytes flow into system/library calls.
 - dramatically reduce the mutation space.
 - Checksum-aware fuzzing
 - Disable checksum checks by control flow alternation.
 - Generate correct checksum fields in invalid inputs.
- TaintScope detected dozens of serious previous unknown vulnerabilities.

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Thanks for your attention!